(e.g., accuracy, precision, and the analytical sensitivity and specificity) specifications for any procedure used for diagnosis.

[70 FR 13316, Mar. 18, 2005, as amended at 77 FR 61110, Oct. 5, 2012]

## §73.2 Purpose and scope.

This part implements the provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins. The biological agents and toxins listed in this part have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, to animal health, or to animal products. Overlap select agents and toxins are subject to regulation by both CDC and APHIS.

## $\S 73.3$ HHS select agents and toxins.

- (a) Except for exclusions under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, the HHS Secretary has determined that the biological agents and toxins listed in this section have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. The select agents and toxins marked with an asterisk (\*) are designated as Tier 1 select agents and toxins and are subject to additional requirements as listed in this part.
  - (b) HHS select agents and toxins:

Abrin

Botulinum neurotoxins\*

Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium\*

Conotoxins paralytic conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence X<sub>1</sub>CCX<sub>2</sub>PACGX<sub>3</sub>X<sub>4</sub>X<sub>5</sub>X<sub>6</sub>CX<sub>7</sub>)

Coxiella burnetii

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus

Diacetoxyscirpenol

Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus

Ebola virus\*

Francisella tularensis\*

Lassa fever virus

Lujo virus

Marburg virus

Monkeypox virus

Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments (Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)

Ricin

Rickettsia prowazekii

SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)

Saxitoxin

South American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses:

Chapare Guanarito

Junin

Machupo

Sabia

Staphylococcal enterotoxins (subtypes A-E)

T-2 toxin

Tetrodotoxin

Tick-borne encephalitis virus

Far Eastern subtype

Siberian subtype

Kyasanur Forest disease virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus

Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)\*

Variola minor virus (Alastrim)\*

Yersinia pestis\*

- (c) Genetic Elements, Recombinant and/or Synthetic Nucleic Acids, and Recombinant and/or Synthetic Organisms:
- (1) Nucleic acids that can produce infectious forms of any of the select agent viruses listed in paragraph (b) of this section.
- (2) Recombinant and/or Synthetic nucleic acids that encode for the functional form(s) of any of the toxins listed in paragraph (b) of this section if the nucleic acids:
- (i) Can be expressed in vivo or in vitro,
- (ii) Are in a vector or recombinant host genome and can be expressed in vivo or in vitro.
- (3) HHS select agents and toxins listed in paragraph (b) of this section that have been genetically modified.
- (d) HHS select agents or toxins that meet any of the following criteria are excluded from the requirements of this part:
- (1) Any HHS select agent or toxin that is in its naturally occurring environment provided the select agent or toxin has not been intentionally introduced, cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted from its natural source.
- (2) Non-viable HHS select agents or nonfunctional HHS toxins.
- (3) Except as required in §73.16(1), the aggregate amount of the toxin under the control of a principal investigator, treating physician or veterinarian, or commercial manufacturer or tributor does not, at any time, exceed the following amounts: 100 mg of Abrin: 0.5of Botulinum mg neurotoxins; 100 mg of Conotoxins

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(Short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence  $X_1CCX_2PACGX_3X_4X_5X_6CX_7$ ); 1,000 mg of Diacetoxyscirpenol; 100 mg of Ricin; 100 mg of Saxitoxin; 5 mg of Staphylococcal enterotoxins (subtypes A–E); 1,000 mg of T–2 toxin; or 100 mg of Tetrodotoxin.

- (i) The amounts are transferred only after the transferor uses due diligence and documents that the recipient has a legitimate need (i.e., reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose) to handle or use such toxins. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section, the HHS Secretary retains the authority to, without prior notification, inspect and copy or request the submission of the due diligence documentation to the CDC.
- (ii) Reports to CDC if they detect a known or suspected violation of Federal law or become aware of suspicious activity related to a toxin listed in this part.
- (4) An animal inoculated with or exposed to an HHS select toxin.
- (5) Any South American genotypes of Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus and any West African Clade of Monkeypox virus provided that the individual or entity can verify that the agent is within the exclusion category.
- (e) An attenuated strain of a select agent or an inactive form of a select toxin may be excluded from the requirements of this part based upon a determination by the HHS Secretary that the attenuated strain or inactivated toxin does not pose a severe threat to public health and safety.
- (1) To apply for exclusion, an individual or entity must submit a written request and supporting scientific information. A written decision granting or denying the request will be issued. An exclusion will be effective upon notification to the applicant. Exclusions will be listed on the National Select Agent Registry Web site at <a href="http://www.selectagents.gov/">http://www.selectagents.gov/</a>.
- (2) If an excluded attenuated strain or inactivated toxin is subjected to any manipulation that restores or enhances its virulence or toxic activity, the resulting select agent or toxin will be subject to the requirements of this part.

- (f) Any HHS select agent or toxin seized by a Federal law enforcement agency will be excluded from the requirements of this part during the period between seizure of the select agent or toxin and the transfer or destruction of such agent or toxin provided that:
- (1) As soon as practicable, the Federal law enforcement agency transfers the seized select agent or toxin to an entity eligible to receive such agent or toxin or destroys the agent or toxin by a recognized sterilization or inactivation process,
- (2) The Federal law enforcement agency safeguards and secures the seized select agent or toxin against theft, loss, or release, and reports any theft, loss, or release of such agent or toxin, and
- (3) The Federal law enforcement agency reports the seizure of the select agent or toxin to CDC or APHIS.
- (i) The seizure of Botulinum neurotoxins, Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium, Ebola viruses, Francisella tularensis, Marburg virus, Variola major virus (Smallpox virus), Variola minor (Alastrim), or Yersinia pestis must be reported within 24 hours by telephone, facsimile, or email. This report must be followed by submission of APHIS/CDC Form 4 within seven calendar days after seizure of the select agent or toxin.
- (ii) For all other HHS select agents or toxins, APHIS/CDC Form 4 must be submitted within seven calendar days after seizure of the agent or toxin.
- (iii) A copy of APHIS/CDC Form 4 must be maintained for three years.
- (4) The Federal law enforcement agency reports the final disposition of the select agent or toxin by submission of APHIS/CDC Form 4. A copy of the completed form must be maintained for three years.

[70 FR 13316, Mar. 18, 2005, as amended at 70 FR 61049, Oct. 20, 2005; 73 FR 61365, Oct. 16, 2008; 73 FR 64554, Oct. 30, 2008; 77 FR 61110, Oct. 5, 2012]

## §73.4 Overlap select agents and toxins.

(a) Except for exclusions under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, the HHS Secretary has determined that the biological agents and toxins listed in this section have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health